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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3629 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LUIS ANTONIO DUTTON-MYRIE, 
ALSO KNOWN AS SAM MORRIS 
 
Luis Antonio Dutton-Myrie, 
 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 3-07-cr-00445-001 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge

 
 
(Filed: May 18, 2012) 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
                                              

 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
An indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania charged Luis Antonio Dutton-Myrie, a native and citizen of Panama, with 
illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  
Dutton-Myrie filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, contending that the underlying 
deportation order was invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  The District Court appropriately 
recognized that a motion to dismiss an indictment is “not „a permissible vehicle for 
addressing the sufficiency of the government‟s evidence.‟”  United States v. Bergrin, 650 
F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 660-
61 (3d Cir. 2000)).  It treated Dutton-Myrie‟s submission as a motion under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) that it could “determine without a trial of the general 
issue.”  After the Court denied the motion, Dutton-Myrie entered a conditional guilty 
plea, preserving his right to challenge the District Court‟s ruling that his deportation order 
did not satisfy the criteria in § 1326(d).  The Court sentenced Dutton-Myrie to, inter alia, 
time served.  This timely appeal followed.
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Before us, Dutton-Myrie contends that the District Court erred because he 
demonstrated that his deportation order was invalid under § 1326(d).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s determination.  United States v. Charleswell, 456 
F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under § 1326(d), an alien may avoid conviction for 
                                              
1
  The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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unlawful reentry if he “demonstrates that (1) [he] exhausted any administrative remedies 
that may have been available to seek relief against the [deportation] order; (2) the 
deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived [him] of the 
opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  The District Court determined that Dutton-Myrie satisfied the first 
two criteria, but that he failed to show that the deportation order was fundamentally 
unfair.   
In its analysis of § 1326(d)(3), the District Court recognized that in United States 
v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 103 (3d Cir. 2004), we instructed that the question of fundamental 
fairness presents a question of “whether the alien was denied due process.”  The District 
Court concluded that Dutton-Myrie had not been deprived of his right to due process in 
the context of the deportation proceeding as he had “effective notice of the charges 
against him and an opportunity to be heard.”  In addition, the District Court properly 
noted that an alien challenging the fairness of a removal proceeding must demonstrate 
that he was prejudiced by the procedural defect.  Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 358 (holding 
explicitly “that prejudice is a necessary component under [§] 1326(d)”).  Dutton-Myrie, 
the Court concluded, failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice. 
Dutton-Myrie asserts that the District Court erred by concluding he could not 
demonstrate prejudice as a result of the procedural errors in his removal proceeding.  We 
are not persuaded by his arguments.  Even if Dutton-Myrie had pursued an appeal with 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, that decision would not have altered the fact that 
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Dutton-Myrie was removable by virtue of the fact that he had overstayed his visa.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  Although he submits that he could have sought discretionary 
relief under former § 212(c), Dutton-Myrie did not have that avenue of relief open to him 
because he was not a lawful permanent resident.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182, 1996 
Amendments, Subsec. (c).  Furthermore, as the District Court correctly noted, Dutton-
Myrie‟s conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine under Pennsylvania law 
constituted an aggravated felony that also rendered him subject to removal.  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also Garcia v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 
293 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that a Pennsylvania conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute qualified as an aggravated felony).  
Accordingly, we will affirm.  
 
 
